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Abstract
Jevons composed his value theory of nonenties. These creatures are elusive.
Subsequent formal refinements did not eliminate the fundamental flaw but
made it only harder to detect. A vacuous formal structure is one that cannot
be interpreted in some domain. For want of any correspondence in the mone-
tary economy, Jevons’s approach could not produce viable results. Roughly
speaking, Jevons made value dependent on subjective factors. This paper
gives a rigorous formal proof that value is determined by objective conditions.
Within the structural-axiomatic framework there is no formal spare room for
the major behavioral nonentities utility, optimization, rational expectations,
and equilibrium.
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1 Entities and nonentities
Repeated reflection and inquiry have led me to the somewhat novel
opinion, that value depends entirely on utility. (Jevons, 1911, p. 1),
original emphasis
When a person sparks a surprising amount of assent, sympathy, or enthusiasm the
need for a characterization is felt and we say that the person has charisma. The word
functions like the X in an equation. Up to this point not much has happened. We
use one word as a shorthand for a complex and ill-understood social phenomenon.
The trouble begins with inversion, that is, when the placeholder word is used in
an explanation. Then it signifies an identifiable active entity, for example in the
statement: Y won the election because he/she has charisma. Unwittingly one has
slithered into a logical circle. In his methodological writings J. S. Mill criticized
this habitual reification:
Mankind in all ages have had a strong propensity to conclude that
wherever there is a name, there must be a distinguishable separate
entity corresponding to the name; . . . (Mill, 2006b, p. 756)
As long as we cannot identify charisma directly or indirectly in some objective form
any explanation that employs the word is vacuous and not acceptable, at least for
the present, according to scientific standards. Day-to-day communication is mainly
made up of socially accepted reifications. A nonentity’s reality content consists
exclusively in the degree of popular consent. As a matter of fact, most people are
talking most of the time about nonentities and all sounds sensible.
When economists are criticized for employing unrealistic, weird, or empty concepts
the answer is usually (a) physicists do the same, (b) it is an elegant abstraction, (c) it
is only to be understood ‘as if’, (d) it is not decisive for the argument, (e) there is no
alternative. All this sounds good and right but it begs the question. The point of the
criticism is usually that a specific unrealism, the auctioneer for instance, cannot be
justified by (a) to (e) or, for that matter, by any stretch of the imagination.
In general, it is indeed perfectly legitimate to introduce unrealistic or weird concepts
in a conjecture. Newton’s occult force of gravity is the paradigmatic case.
It does not matter that moos and goos cannot appear in the guess. You
can have as much junk in the guess as you like, provided that the
consequences can be compared with experiment. (Feynman, 1992, p.
164)
From this follows, as a matter of course, that not all unrealistic or weird concepts are
acceptable. Those that have no testable implication are not. Hence, they have to go
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out of the window as fast as possible. To recall, physicists have an impressive track
record for both creating and eliminating scores of nonentities. Paradigmatic cases
are epicycles, phlogiston, ether, absolute space and the perpetual motion machine.
It is important, though, to be aware that there is no convenient criterion available
for a hard and fast distinction between an entity and a nonentity. This occasionally
long lasting indecision provides the ecological niche for nonentities.
There are two kinds of unrealism or weirdness: justified and unjustified. Newton
underpinned his occult force with a neat formula. The calculations that were carried
out with it proved to be quite accurately in correspondence with facts. Nothing
roughly comparable ever happened with, for example, utility. Jevons offered his
fellow economists this nonentity as an explanation of economic phenomena and
the great majority eventually adopted it, not realizing that, on closer inspection, it
cannot, as a matter of principle, explain anything.
Newton called assumptions that lack an objective referent hypotheses. And he was
quite explicit that employing nonentities has more to do with fiction than science.
Those who take the foundations of their speculations from hypotheses,
even if they then proceed most rigorously according to mechanical laws,
are merely putting together a romance, elegant perhaps and charming,
but nevertheless a romance. (Roger Cotes, Preface to the second edition
of Newton’s Principia, Newton, 1999, p. 386)
The romance of standard economics, rigorous and elegant as it is, has been based
on four behavioral nonentities: utility, optimization, rational expectation, and equi-
librium. The present paper is concerned in greater detail with the role of utility in
the explanation of value.
2 Words don’t matter – do they?
One must be able to say at all times – instead of points, straight lines,
and planes – tables, chairs, and beer mugs. (Hilbert, 1935, p. 403)
Formally, a theory consists of premises and conclusions or axioms and theorems;
and, hopefully, it tells us something important about reality that we hitherto did
not know. In mathematics, we have solely axioms and theorems. Here, the key
point of axiomatization is that basic concepts are not defined with reference to real
world objects and relations, but implicitly and uno actu by laying down the set of
axioms. Thus, the axioms can have an arbitrary number of real world interpretations.
Or, vice versa, entirely different and seemingly unrelated real world phenomena
may be expressible by the same axiomatic structure. For the mathematicians
the formal properties of an axiom set and its logical implications are of primary
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interest; they can deal with them without ever taking notice of the possible real
world interpretations. Hence the question of the realism or unrealism of basic
concepts does not arise at all. The axioms create a self-contained formal world
that surprisingly often, but by no means always, finds a correspondence in the real
world.
From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears thus as a store-
house of abstract forms – the mathematical structures; and it so happens
– without our knowing why – that certain aspects of empirical reality
fit themselves into these forms, as if through a kind of preadaptation.
(Bourbaki, 2005, p. 1276)
Debreu took advantage of this dichotomy. His proof of the existence of a price
vector that satisfies the conditions of market clearing, budget balancing and Pareto
optimality does, in the strict sense, in no way deal with the economy but exclusively
with a clearly defined mathematical object that has no meaning beyond itself. Strictly
speaking, it would make no difference if price, market, and budget were replaced by
table, chair and beer mug. Realism or unrealism is not an issue at the formal base
line.
Allegiance to rigor dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis where
the theory, in the strict sense, is logically entirely disconnected from its
interpretations. (Debreu, 1959, p. x)
This is fine as long as the discussion is kept within the mathematical sphere. Prob-
lems arise when it comes to a real world interpretation. Without interpretation,
Debreu’s mathematical object has nothing at all to do with economics or anything
else outside mathematics.
Formal axiomatic systems must be interpreted in some domain . . . to
become an empirical science. (Boylan and O’Gorman, 1995, p. 198)
Lacking an interpretation that establishes some convincing correspondences with
real world phenomena general equilibrium is a nonentity. This, clearly, is not an
argument against axiomatization.
My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of
science, is no better than its user, and not all users are skilled. (Clower,
1995, p. 308)
The standard axiomatic approach has to be rejected because it does not afford a valid
interpretation in terms of the monetary economy we happen to live in; its formalism
belongs to the ‘whole crop of monster-structures, entirely without application’ (cf.
Bourbaki, 2005, p. 1275, fn. 9). The accustomed approach is beyond repair, yet:
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There is another alternative: to formulate a completely new research
program and conceptual approach. As we have seen, this is often
spoken of, but there is still no indication of what it might mean. (Ingrao
and Israel, 1990, p. 362)
The conceptual consequence of the present paper is to discard the familiar subjective-
behavioral axioms and to take objective-structural axioms as the formal point of
departure.
In the following, Section 3 first provides the new formal foundations with the set
of four structural axioms. These represent the evolving consumption economy as
the most elementary economic configuration. The structural axiom set excludes
nonentities. In Section 4 the properties of the market clearing price for a reproducible
monetary economy are determined. In Section 5 the economy is differentiated. This
raises the question of how the labor input is allocated. It is shown that the zero profit
condition determines the exchange value and that the breakup of the expenditure
ratios determines the allocation. With the help of the obtained results it is then
possible to exactly localize, in Section 6, the logical black holes in Jevons’s approach.
Section 7 concludes.
3 Principles
When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion
formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces sci-
entific knowledge of a thing. (Resume of Aristotle’s Analytica Priora,
from Wikipedia Posterior Analytics, 2014 Feb)
The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epit-
omize the interdependence of the real and nominal variables that constitutes the
monetary economy.
3.1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditure
in a period of arbitrary length. The period length is conveniently assumed to be
the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have for the beginning one world
economy, one firm, and one product. Axiomatization is about ascertaining the
minimum number of premises.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income, i.e.
the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N. Nothing is implied at this stage
about who owns the shares.
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Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working hours.
O = RL |t (2)
The productivity R depends on the underlying production process. The 2nd axiom
should therefore not be misinterpreted as a linear production function.
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P and
quantity bought X .
C = PX |t (3)
The axioms represent the pure consumption economy, that is, no investment, no
foreign trade, and no government.
The period values of the axiomatic variables are formally connected by the familiar
growth equation, which is added as the 4th axiom.
Zt = Zt−1
(
1+
...
Zt
)
with Z←W, L, D, N, R, P, X , . . .
(4)
The path of the representative variable Zt is then determined by the initial value Z0
and the rates of change
...
Z t for each period.
For a start it is assumed that the elementary axiomatic variables vary at random.
This produces an evolving economy. The respective probability distributions of the
change rates are given in general form by:
Pr
(
lW ≤
...
W ≤ uW
)
Pr (lR ≤
...
R ≤ uR)
Pr (lL ≤
...
L ≤ uL) Pr (lP ≤
...
P ≤ uP)
Pr (lD ≤
...
D ≤ uD) Pr (lX ≤
...
X ≤ uX)
Pr (lN ≤
...
N ≤ uN) |t.
(5)
The four axioms, including (5), constitute a simulation. The simulation replaces
the inoperative set of equations as analytical tool. There is no need at this early
stage to discus the merits and demerits of different probability distributions, which,
by the way, need not be fix over time. It is, of course, also possible to switch to
a completely deterministic rate of change for any variable and any period. The
structural formalism does not require a preliminary decision between determinism
and indeterminism. If, for instance, the upper (u) and lower (l) bounds of the
respective intervals are symmetrical around zero this produces a drifting or stationary
economy as a limiting case of the growing economy.
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The economic content of the four axioms is plain. One point to mention is that total
income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not of wage
income and profit. This distinction makes all the difference between good or bad
economics (see 2013a).
3.2 Definitions
Income categories
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of
the identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. With (6) wage
income YW and distributed profit YD is defined:
YW ≡WL YD ≡ DN |t. (6)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical context
of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
Given the paths of the elementary variables, the development of the composed
variables is also determined. From the random paths of employment L and wage
rate W follows the path of wage income YW . Likewise follows from the paths of
dividend D and number of shares N the path of distributed profit YD. From the 1st
axiom then follows the random path of total income Y.
Ratios
We define the sales ratio as:
ρX ≡ XO |t. (7)
A sales ratio ρX = 1 indicates that the quantity bought/sold X and the quantity
produced O are equal or, in other words, that the product market is cleared.
We define the expenditure ratio as:
ρE ≡ CY |t. (8)
An expenditure ratio ρE = 1 indicates that consumption expenditures C are equal to
total income Y , in other words, that the household sector’s budget is balanced.
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Monetary profit
Total profit consists of monetary and nonmonetary profit. Here we are at first
concerned with monetary profit. Nonmonetary profit is treated at length in (2011).
The business sector’s monetary profit/loss in period t is defined with (9) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditure C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :
Qm ≡C−YW |t. (9)
Because of (3) and (6) this is identical with:
Qm ≡ PX−WL |t. (10)
This form is well-known from the theory of the firm.
The Profit Law
From (9) and (1) follows:
Qm ≡C−Y +YD |t (11)
or, using the definitions (7) and (8),
Qm ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y
with ρD ≡ YDYW |t.
(12)
The four equations (9) to (12) are formally equivalent and show profit under different
perspectives. The Profit Law (12) tells us that total monetary profit is zero if ρE = 1
and ρD = 0. Profit or loss for the business sector as a whole depends on the
expenditure and distributed profit ratio and nothing else (for details see 2013a).
It is important to notice that neither Jevons nor the other founding fathers of marginal-
ism developed a correct profit theory.
Nor do the modern variants add anything whatever on this score. For
Debreu profits are simply a nonissue, while Arrow and Hahn make
only passing reference to profits – and that only as a historical intro-
duction. Whatever may be the usefulness of these idealized theoretical
constructs, they cannot be said to throw any light on the profit issue;
surely, therefore, they fail to capture the essence of a capitalist market
economy. (Obrinsky, 1981, p. 495)
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The lack of a correct profit theory alone suffices to make the standard approach unfit
for any real world application whatsoever.
Individual monetary profit
For firm 1 individually eq. (10) reads in the case of market clearing:
Qm1 ≡ P1X1−W1L1
Qm1 ≡ P1R1L1
(
1− W1
P1R1
)
if ρX1 = 1 |t.
(13)
Monetary profit of firm 1 is zero under the condition that the quotient of wage rate,
price, and productivity is unity. This holds independently of the level of employment
or the size of the firm. From the zero profit condition follows:
P1 =
W1
R1
if ρX1 = 1, Qm1 = 0 |t.
(14)
The price of product 1 is, in the simplest case, equal to unit wage costs.
Relative prices
In the same way one gets the individual profits and the zero profit market clearing
prices for all other firms. With this, the structure of relative prices is determined for
the most elementary case.
P1
P2
=
W1
R1
W2
R2
=
R2
R1
if W1 =W2, ρX1 = 1, ρX2 = 1, Qm1 = 0, Qm2 = 0 |t.
(15)
Under the zero profit condition, relative prices stand in the same relation as unit
wage costs. With equal wage rates, relative prices stand in inverse relation to
productivities.
This limiting case is the structural-axiomatic counterpart to Walras’s zero profit
general equilibrium. In the case of a non-zero profit economy the derivation of the
market clearing price vector is a bit more involved.
9
From relative prices in (15) we advance to the classical term value:
The word Value, when used without adjunct, always means, in political
economy, value in exchange; or as it has been called by Adam Smith
and his successors, exchangeable value, . . . (Mill, 2006a, p. 457)
If P1 is double P2 then half a unit of X1 exchanges for one unit of X2. Eq. (15) states
that the exchange value is, under the condition of zero profit and equal wage rates
in the two lines of production, equal to the inverse of the productivities. Value is
objectively determined by the production conditions. There is no formal room left
for subjective-behavioral notions like utility. The zero profit condition is sufficient
to exclude utility as an explanation of value.
Retained profit
Once profit has come into existence for the first time (that is: logically – a historical
account is an entirely different matter) the business sector has the option to distribute
or to retain it. This in turn has an effect on profit. This effect is captured by (11) but
it is invisible in (9). Both equations, though, are formally equivalent.
Retained profit Qre is defined for the business sector as a whole as the difference
between profit and distributed profit in period t:
Qre ≡ Qm−YD ⇒ Qre ≡C−Y |t. (16)
Retained profit is, due to (11), equal to the difference of consumption expenditures
and total income.
Monetary saving
The household sector’s monetary saving is given as the difference of income and
consumption expenditures (for nonmonetary saving see 2011):
Sm ≡ Y −C |t. (17)
In combination with (16) follows:
Qre ≡−Sm |t. (18)
Monetary saving and retained profit always move in opposite directions. This is
the Special Complementarity. It says that the complementary notion to saving is
negative retained profit; positive retained profit is the complementary of dissaving.
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There is no such thing as an equality of saving and investment in the consumption
economy, nor, for that matter, in the investment economy (for details see 2013b).
If distributed profit is zero then follows as a corollary of (18):
Qm =−Sm
if YD = 0
|t. (19)
Profit is zero in the limiting case of zero distributed profit and zero saving. Otherwise
profit is equal to dissaving, loss is equal to saving in a given period. To focus the
analysis, distributed profit and saving is set to zero in the following.
3.3 Nonentities excluded
Equilibrium in whatever definition is not taken into the premises. Methodologically,
this would amount to a petitio principii (cf. Mill, 2006b, pp. 819-827). Not admitted
are, in addition, utility, optimization, and rational expectation. The first rule of
theory building says: never put a behavioral assumption into the premises, or, as
Newton famously said: hypotheses non fingo.
4 The market clearing price
But in political economy the greatest errors arise from overlooking the
most obvious truths. (Mill, 2006a, p. 458)
From (3), (7), and (8) follows the price as dependent variable:
P =
ρE
ρX
W
R
(
1+
YD
YW
)
|t. (20)
This is the general structural axiomatic law of supply and demand for the pure
consumption economy with one firm (for the generalization see 2014a). In brief,
the price equation states that the market clearing price, i.e. ρX = 1, is ultimately
determined by the expenditure ratio, unit wage costs, and the income distribution.
Note that the quantity of money is not among the determinants. This rules the
commonplace quantity theory out. The structural axiomatic price formula is testable
in principle.
Under the condition of market clearing and zero distributed profit follows:
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P = ρE
W
R
if ρX = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(21)
The market clearing price depends now alone on the expenditure ratio and unit
wage costs. All changes of the wage rate, of the productivity, and of the average
expenditure ratio affect the market clearing price in the period under consideration.
We refer to this formal property as conditional price flexibility because (21) involves
no assumption about human behavior, only the purely formal condition ρX = 1.
Under the additional conditions of budget balancing follows:
P =
W
R
if ρE = 1, ρX = 1, YD = 0 |t.
(22)
The market clearing price is equal to unit wage costs if the expenditure ratio is unity
and distributed profit is zero. In this elementary case, profit per unit is zero and by
consequence total profit is zero. All changes of the wage rate and the productivity
affect the market clearing price in the period under consideration.
With (22) the real wage WP is uno actu given; it is under the enumerated conditions
invariably equal to the productivity R. The agents gets the whole product. The real
wage is determined by the production conditions and not in the labor market.
With regard to standard economics, the structural axiom set has two important
implications: (a) the market clearing price is not determined by the quantity of
money, (b) the real wage is not determined by supply-demand-equilibrium in the
labor market. In other words, seen from the structural-axiomatic standpoint the
commonplace quantity theory and the standard labor market theory are false.
It has to be emphasized that market clearing, budget balancing, and zero profit
are conditions that apply also to Walras’s original model. On this score, there is
absolutely no difference.
5 Allocation in the two-markets consumption economy
The theory thus represents the fact, that a person distributes his income
in such a way as to equalize the utility of the final increments of all
commodities consumed. (Jevons, 1911, p. 140)
We now introduce a second market and determine the allocation of total labor
input L between the two lines of production.
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Total income (1) remains unchanged:
Y =WL+ DN︸︷︷︸
0
|t. (23)
The partitioning of labor input is given by:
L≡ L1 +L2 |t. (24)
With given productivities the respective outputs in the two lines of production follow
from (2) as:
O1 = R1L1
O2 = R2L2
|t. (25)
From (3) follows for the respective consumption expenditures:
C1 = P1X1
C2 = P2X2
|t. (26)
From (8) follow as corollaries:
C1 = ρE1Y
C2 = ρE2Y
if ρE1, ρE1 are taken as independent |t.
(27)
Under the condition of market clearing eqs. (27), (26) and (25) boil down to:
P1
P2
R1
R2
L1
L2
=
ρE1
ρE2
if ρX1 = 1, ρX2 = 1 |t.
(28)
Relative prices are determined by the zero profit condition (15) and this gives:
L1
L2
=
ρE1
ρE2
if Qm1 = 0, Qm2 = 0, W1 =W2, ρX1 = 1, ρX2 = 1 |t.
(29)
Under the enumerated conditions, the labor input is allocated in direct proportion
to the expenditure ratios. The partitioning of demand determines the allocation of
labor. This presupposes, of course, that labor can move freely between the two
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firms. The absolute amount of labor input in firm 1, and analogous in firm 2, is
finally given by:
L1 = ρE1L
if Qm1 = 0, Qm2 = 0, W1 =W2, ρX1 = 1, ρX2 = 1
L≡ L1 +L2, ρE1 +ρE2 = 1 |t.
(30)
What remains to be done is to determine the partitioning of final demand between
the two goods. Here we arrive at the open interface to utility theory.
Eq. (28) is first rewritten as:
P1
P2
X1
X2
=
ρE1
ρE2
if ρX1 = 1, ρX2 = 1 |t.
(31)
The familiar optimum condition says that the marginal rate of substitution MRS is
equal to the price ratio. This condition is met at the tangential point of the budget
line with an indifference curve (for details see 2014a, Sec. 3.3). The tangential point
provides the respective quantities X1, X2. Together with the given price relation
eq. (31) then delivers the optimal partitioning of the consumption expenditures
C1, C2 or, what amounts to the same, the optimal breakup of the expenditure ratios
ρE1, ρE2. All is fine therefore, except for the fact that the indifference curve is a
nonentity.
The marginal principle asserts, in Jevons’s language, that the ratio of marginal
utilities is equal to relative prices but it cannot tell us where the tangential point is lo-
cated. Hence there is no way to determine the quantities X1, X2 and by consequence
the distribution of expenditures between the goods. In plain words Jevons asserts, I
cannot give you the coordinates where the agents stand but it is an optimum. This
optimum, though, he has put himself into the hat.
It would be possible at any time to integrate marginal utility into the structural-
axiomatic framework in order to determine the expenditure ratios for different
products but this amounts to nothing because the marginal principle cannot tell us
what we want to know. To ask: where does an indifference curve touch the budget
line is, apart from the wording, not different from asking how many angels can
dance on the head of a pin.
Economists think of themselves as scientists, but . . . they are more like
theologians. (Nelson, 2006, p. xv)
In any case they are primarily concerned with nonentities.
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6 Winding up the Vacuous Jevonian Interlude
Reification (also known as concretism, or the fallacy of misplaced
concreteness) is a fallacy of ambiguity, when an abstraction (abstract
belief or hypothetical construct) is treated as if it were a concrete, real
event, or physical entity. In other words, it is the error of treating as
a concrete thing something which is not concrete, but merely an idea.
(Wikipedia Reification, 2014 Feb)
6.1 Value and allocation
We have seen above, eq. (15), that the exchange value is objectively determined by
the zero profit condition and therefore has nothing at all to do with a final degree of
utility. From the systemic standpoint it is irrelevant whether the agents realize some
kind of optimum or not. It is not irrelevant, though, whether the firms break even or
not. An economy with loss making firms is not reproducible over a longer time span.
Zero profit is a minimum condition, positive overall profit is the normal case in the
real world. Jevons’s profit formula, (1911, p. 270), is demonstrably false and this,
as a matter of principle, invalidates his value theory already before the speculation
about the final degree of utility sets in. Independently of this, the subjective value
theory has to be refuted on its own terms.
Let us start with an economy where the respective productivities in period t=1 are
given by the actual production conditions and where the households have partitioned
their total consumption expenditures which in turn are equal to total income. The
conditions of market clearing, budget balancing and zero profit apply. For the sake
of illustration, let the two products be bread and water (wine would be better, of
course, but not straightforwardly lead us to the water-diamond paradox). In this case,
the exchange value of water is objectively determined by the production conditions
in both firms according to (15) (see also Arrow and Hahn, p. 14).
The quantity of water that is produced and sold depends on the partitioning of
consumption expenditures according to (29). If the expenditure ratio for water
is high relative to that for bread, the greater part of labour input is allocated to
water production. The breakup of expenditure ratios can be observed and exactly
measured for all households and all periods. There is no problem with the data. Yet,
why the expenditure ratios are what they are is unknown to any observer. To say
that the partitioning depends on preferences is neither true nor false but a pointless
reification. To assert that the partitioning is optimal is pure verbiage. An utility
function or an indifference map is a nonentity and that is that.
Now let the productivity of water production increase in period t=2. The first
round effect is this: the price goes down and the quantity goes up such that total
expenditures for water remain constant. This hyperbolic adaptation leaves the rest
of the economy undisturbed. The only thing that changes is the real consumption
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pattern. The households’ diet is now composed of more water and an unchanged
quantity of bread. Hyperbolic adaptation, to be sure, is a convenient idealization.
The households may be happy with the new composition of consumption goods. In
this case, the adaptation process ends. If the households want to restore the previous
relation of water and bread they have to reduce the expenditures for water and to
increase the expenditures for bread. The business sector then reallocates labor input
at the going wage rate. There is no price signaling of any sort. Total income, total
consumption expenditures, and the price of water and bread are not affected by the
reallocation. The price mechanism is fully replaced by the quantity mechanism.
At the end of the adaptation process, which consists of two logical steps, the
exchange value of water is lower according to the new productivities as determined
by (15). The claim that the marginal utilities of water and bread have been equal
before the adaptation and are equal after the adaptation can neither be proved nor
disproved, it is therefore empty.
There is no need and no place for the nonentity utility and its derivatives and variants
in theoretical economics. Theoretical economics is about the systemic properties of
the economy and not about reading the thoughts of agents. There is nothing ever to
be expected from second-guessing homo oeconomicus.
6.2 Primary and secondary markets
Up to this point we have only considered perishable consumption goods. Conditions
change when we take durable goods into the picture. A car or a house is bought in
period t but consumed over a longer time span; consumption expenditures C and
valued consumption K are therefore different (for details see 2011, Sec. 4.2).
Conditions are again different when, in the limiting case, no consumption takes
place at all. Ricardo clearly recognized this and excluded “rare statues and pictures,
scarce books and coins, . . . ” from the classical value theory (1981, p. 12). Jevons
took up this remark and used it as a refutation of the labour theory of value (1911, p.
163). He did not realize that goods which are not consumed like bread and water
are not subject to his own Law of the Variation of Utility which refers explicitly
to varying quantities of food (1911, pp. 45-49). Adam Smith’s narrow-stomach
argument does not apply beyond a very small realm.
Let the two goods in the example of Section 6.1 now be diamonds and water
(yes, this combination lacks vitamins). This requires an update of the productivity
R1 and of the price P1 in (28) but nothing more. While the productivity in the
water production remains unchanged, compared to diamonds the exchange value
of one unit of water will be ‘lower’ in quantitative terms than compared to bread.
The quantities, however, have different dimensions (liter, kilogram, carat). The
respective prices of diamonds and water are definitely determined by the conditions
of market clearing, budget balancing, and zero profit.
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Since diamonds are not consumed and do not vanish from the commodity space the
story does not end in the period of production. Beginning with the next period, the
diamonds assume the role of a store of value. At first, those agents who have bought
the diamonds in period t cannot sell them in period t+1. There is simply no market.
Since income has always been fully spent in the pure consumption economy nobody
is in the possession of the requisite stock of money. What is logically needed first,
then, is that some agents accumulate money.
Let us assume that one half of the households saves and the other half dissaves such
that saving and dissaving are equal and the household sector as a whole neither
saves nor dissaves. Thus, the overall expenditure ratio is still unity (for details see
2014b, Sec. 3). Total income is fully spent, just as in the bread-water economy. The
significant difference is that the deposits and overdrafts of the household sector at
the central bank, which stands for the banking industry as a whole, grow in lockstep.
The owners of deposits eventually become the potential buyers of diamonds.
What emerges in the process is that we have now two entirely different kinds of
markets: the primary market where the goods out of current production are sold and
the secondary market where all kinds of durables are sold.
The primary and secondary markets function according to different rules. For
the primary market the income out of current production and saving/dissaving
is relevant, for the secondary market the accumulated stock of deposits and the
possibility of credit leverage is relevant. Of course, there are interdependencies
between the two kinds of markets. They are ignored for the moment.
The crucial point is that it is positively misleading to speak of “the” market. There
are – at least – two different types of markets and to treat them equally is a gross
technical blunder. There is no such thing as “the” market. A value theory that
does not account for this elementary economic fact is vacuous. The marginalistic
approach squarely falls into this category.
What is important with regard to Jevons’s value theory is this: even if we grant,
for the sake of argument, that there is something like marginal utility it would be
only applicable to the primary market but not to the secondary market. Water as
a consumption good is not comparable to diamonds as a pure store of value. The
assertion that the low price of water corresponds to a low marginal utility and that
the high price of diamonds corresponds to a high marginal utility is unacceptable
even in Jevons’s own frame of reference. To apply the Law of the Variation of
Utility to the secondary market is simply a category mistake.
What is really paradoxical about the diamond-water paradox is that its apparent
resolution by superficially distinguishing between total and marginal utility was
accepted so long by so many economists. Fortunately, that is over now. Utility has
been definitely identified as nonentity. As Keynes aptly put it (Moggridge, 1976, p.
39): ‘a little clear thinking’ can solve ‘almost any problem.’
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7 Conclusion
Our science has become far too much a stagnant one, in which opinions
rather than experience and reason are appealed to. (Jevons, 1911, p.
277)
The secular stagnation of the standard approach can be traced back to Jevons himself.
His approach, which has been greatly refined but never thoroughly rectified, is based
on indefensible premises.
The standard subjective-behavioral axioms are in the present paper replaced by
objective-structural axioms. The set of four structural axioms constitutes the most
elementary case of an evolving consumption economy. The formalism is absolutely
transparent, the logical implications are testable in principle.
The main results of the structural axiomatic analysis of value are:
• Neither Jevons nor the other founding fathers of marginalism developed a
correct profit theory. The lack of a correct profit theory alone suffices to make
the standard approach unfit for any real world application whatsoever.
• Exchange value is objectively determined by the production conditions and
therefore has nothing at all to do with a final degree of utility. There is no
formal room left for subjective-behavioral notions like utility. The zero profit
condition is sufficient to exclude utility as an explanation of value.
• The structural-axiomatic conditions of market clearing, budget balancing,
and zero profit apply also to Walras’s original model. On this score, there is
absolutely no difference. The difference is in the axioms.
• It would be possible at any time to integrate marginal utility into the structural-
axiomatic framework in order to determine the expenditure ratios for different
products but this amounts to nothing because the marginal principle cannot
tell us what we want to know.
• There are – at least – two different types of markets and to treat them equally
is a gross technical blunder. There is no such thing as “the” market. A value
theory that does not account for this elementary economic fact is vacuous.
The marginalistic approach squarely falls into this category.
18
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